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Abstract 
Griffiths et al. (2015) have proposed a quantitative measure of causal specificity and used it to 
assess various attempts to single out genetic causes as being causally more specific than other 
cellular mechanisms, for example, alternative splicing. Focusing in particular on 
developmental processes, they have identified a number of important challenges for this 
project. In this discussion note, I would like to show how these challenges can be met. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of causal specificity is of considerable interest to the philosophy of biology 
because it promises to provide a rationale for the appeal of a certain kind of explanatory 
strategy that has been very prominent in 20th and 21st Century biology. This strategy consists 
in focusing explanations on biological entities that are often described as information-bearing, 
a kind of description that many take to be metaphorical (e.g., Sarkar 1996; Griffiths 2001).1 
The usual suspects for such biological entities include genomic DNA as well as messenger-
RNA (mRNA), which feature prominently in countless biological explanations and are often 
described as “determining” the sequences within proteins or RNAs. However, as proponents 
of Developmental Systems Theory have pointed out, we should respect a principle of “causal 
parity” or “parity of reasoning” and not take it for granted that such entities actually do play 
such a special causal role (e.g., Oyama 2000; Griffiths and Gray 2005). The attribution of any 
such role requires some positive account of what exactly that special role consists in, which 
has proven to be more difficult than one might have thought. 
 A promising attempt to provide such an account has used the idea that what 
distinguishes genetic material from other biological causes is their causal specificity (Waters 
																																																								
1 Griffiths and Stotz (2013, Ch. 6) argue that the notion of genetic information is metaphorical 
but that such metaphors play a constructive role in science.  
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2007; Woodward 2010; for a critique see Griffiths and Stotz 2013, Ch. 4).2 According to this 
idea, some causes allow a much more fine-grained control over their effect variable than 
others. For example, a light dimmer allows a more fine-grained control of light intensity than a 
simple toggle switch. Similarly, so it is argued, DNA and RNA sequence variation is a causal 
difference-maker that has a more fine-grained control over their effects than other parts of a 
living cell, e.g., the enzymes that are necessary for protein synthesis. Is it this fine-grain or 
specificity that justifies the biologists’ highlighting of certain biomolecules as information-
bearers, even if the latter description should still be metaphorical?  
 Existing attempts to answer this question in the affirmative are largely qualitative. 
Waters (2007) as well as Woodward (2010) treat causal specificity as a property of causal 
relations that is either present or absent, even though they both hint that it admits of degrees. 
Weber (2006, 2013) considers it to be a matter of degree and argues that some genetic causes, 
namely DNA and mRNA, manifest a greater degree of specificity with respect to RNA or 
protein sequence than other causal factors involved in gene expression (Waters 2007 
tentatively accepts this claim in a footnote).  However, no quantitative measure of the degree 
of causal specificity was available then. Thus, Griffiths et al. have done us a great service in 
developing a way of measuring it. In fact, they provide the first precise definition of this 
notion. Basically, they identify causal specificity with the mutual information that 																																																								
2 There are other attempts that all have their merits in my view, e.g., Stegmann’s (2014) idea 
of external ordering or Shea’s (2007) infotel theory, but they shall not be considered here. 
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interventions on a cause variable and the value of an effect variable bear on each other. Thus, 
basic concepts of information theory turn out to be helpful.  
 Using this information-theoretic specificity measure, Griffiths et al. venture to compare 
different causes of organismic development with respect to their causal specificity. They 
consider three kinds of causal specificity, namely the specificity of the total potential variation 
of the cause variable with respect to its effect (labeled “INF”, after Woodward 2010) as well 
as the specificity of the actual variation in select populations or “SAD” (inspired by Waters 
2007). In addition, they examine Weber’s (2013) idea of considering only the relevant 
potential variation (REL) where relevance is defined in terms of biological normality. I take 
the upshot of their analysis to be the following. First, the specificity of causes depends 
strongly on what probability distribution over the states of a causal variable is assumed. 
Second, in the context of developmental biology, SAD returns no significantly greater 
specificity for DNA than for alternative splicing. Third, in spite of being targeted at relevant 
variation, REL alone fails to provide a sufficient criterion for relevant causal specificity; a 
sufficient criterion would have to take into account additional parameters such as timescales.  
 I applaud the introduction of a precise, quantitative definition of causal specificity to 
this debate and agree with Griffiths et al. that our causal specificity comparisons had better be 
biologically meaningful. What I want to show here is that the quantitative version of causal 
specificity as defined by Griffiths et al. can actually do the job for which its qualitative 
ancestor was introduced into the philosophy of biology by Woodward and Waters: to provide 
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a rationale for the biologists’ highlighting of DNA and related biomolecules in some of their 
explanations.  
 I will proceed as follows. First, I briefly present the specificity measure proposed by 
Griffiths et al. (Section 2). In Section 3, I examine which kind of causal specificity is 
meaningfully compared between different biological causes. I conclude that it is relevant 
potential variation (REL). Section 4 then applies this measure to alternative splicing and 
Section 5 to DNA sequence variation. Section 6 draws together my main points.  
 
2. What Is Causal Specificity and How Can We Measure It? 
Both Waters (2007) and Woodward (2010) introduce causal specificity by using David 
Lewis’s (2000) concept of influence (which the latter introduced for a different purpose, 
namely to define the causal relation itself). On the basis of this, Woodward defines what it 
means for a causal relation to be specific: 
 
(INF) There are a number of different possible states of C (C1… Cn), a number of 
different possible states of E (E1… Em) and a mapping F from C to E such that for 
many states of C each such state has a unique image under F in E (that is, F is a 
function or close to it, so that the same state of C is not associated with different states 
of E, either on the same or different occasions), not too many different states of C are 
mapped onto the same state of E and most states of E are the image under F of some 
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state of C. This mapping F should describe patterns of counterfactual dependency 
between states of C and states of E that support interventionist counterfactuals. 
Variations in the time and place of occurrence of the various states of E should 
similarly depend on variations in the time and place of occurrence of states of C 
(Woodward 2010, p. 305). 
 
For Woodward, the relation INF (after Lewis’s term “influence”) does not define causal 
dependence; it is rather a relation that causal links may or may not manifest. However, given 
this definition it could be argued that INF is a matter of degree where the degree depends on 
the number of states that are correlated by the mapping as well as the closeness of the mapping 
to a bijection. Griffiths et al. argue that both of these two factors affect the amount of 
information that is gained about the effect by intervening on a cause variable. To take this into 
account, they define causal specificity or SPEC as the information gained about the state of the 
effect variable by setting the cause variable to an exogenously determined value. Using 
information theory, Griffiths et al. identify SPEC with the difference between the entropy of 
the effect variable's value set H(E) and its entropy conditional on setting the cause variable to 
some specific value. Formally, this can be represented by using Pearl's 'do ( )' operator which 
is symbolized by a hat: 
 𝐼 𝐸; 𝐶 = 𝐻 𝐸 − 𝐻 𝐸 𝐶  
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The causal specificity of C relative to E, thus, is the mutual information 𝐼 𝐸; 𝐶 , which 
corresponds to the difference in entropy before and after an intervention.  
 Having briefly outlined the basic idea of the specificity measure proposed by Griffiths 
et al., I will now turn to the different kinds of variation for which causal specificity may be 
compared. 
 	
3. Which Kind of Causal Specificity Should We Compare? 
As was already indicated, causal specificity can be measured over the range of all possible 
values that a causal variable can take (INF), some range of values that are taken to be relevant 
(REL) or the actual values that the variable takes in a real population (SAD). When comparing 
biological causes, which kind of causal specificity matters for highlighting some causes for 
their explanatory salience? I will briefly argue here that the most informative feature is the 
relevant potential variation or REL.  
Let us first consider SAD, the actual variation. In their comparisons, Griffiths et al. 
want to take into consideration the causal specificity that inheres in “the variation between 
cells in an organism, both spatial and temporal” (545).  However, in their actual calculations 
they assume that the splice variants are equally probable. This seems to be at odds with their 
intention to use “the actual probability distribution over the values of a causal variable in some 
population” (541-542), for this would require that the actual frequencies of the different splice 
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variants be taken into account. If some splice variants were overwhelmingly more abundant 
than others, this could significantly reduce the entropy of the probability distribution and 
therefore the causal specificity. It is of course unlikely that all splice variants occur with the 
same frequency in any actual population, thus it is not clear what the entropy figures 
calculated actually mean with respect to actual populations. Griffiths et al. cite as the main 
reason for this the lack of data on the real probabilities.  
It seems to me that the difficulties with SAD run deeper than a lack of data. The main 
problem is that SAD is very sensitive to the relative abundance of a causal factor in some 
defined population. Thus, SAD-values will be highly context-dependent, to such an extent as 
to make any kind of systematic comparison across contexts difficult.  
 INF is the causal specificity of the possible range of values for a variable, which may 
be assumed to be equiprobable. Mad or gerrymandered possibilities show that there is a 
problem with this measure, which is due to a lack of constraints on the space of possibilities. 
For example, Weber (2013) discusses a scenario for protein synthesis where the codon-amino 
acid assignments jointly mediated by tRNA and aminoacyl-tRNA synthase enzymes are 
altered after each round of the ribosome cycle by a hypothetical intervention. A similarly mad 
scenario exists for alternative splicing (see the next section). I see no reason why such mad 
scenarios, even though they are physically possible, should be considered as biologically 
meaningful because these possibilities are inaccessible. For this reason, I think the most 
meaningful comparisons to make are between some relevant sets of possibilities. Of course, 
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different relevance criteria are imaginable, but Weber’s (2013) suggestion to include those 
possible values of the variables that could be produced by biologically normal interventions 
seems appropriate in at least some biological contexts. Biologically normal interventions as 
defined by Weber (2013) are such that they (1) could also be a result of natural processes at 
some non-negligible probability and (2) are compatible with the normal biological functioning 
of the rest of the organism.3 A point mutation would be an example of a biologically normal 
intervention in this sense, while a complete change of the codon specificities of tRNA after 
each round of the ribosome cycle wouldn’t be. This is why biologists consider DNA and 
mRNA to be information-bearing molecules while tRNAs and aminoacyl-tRNA synthase 
molecules are viewed as being part of the machinery that merely “reads” or “expresses” the 
genetic information, even though there is no difference in causal specificity of the potential 
variation of these biomolecules. And this is also why they consider the causal specificity of the 
potential DNA as well as mRNA variation to be biologically relevant, while a large range of 
possible splice variants, namely those that are not producible by biologically normal 
interventions, are of no interest to them. 
 The most important alternative is Waters (2007), who has persuasively argued that 
biologists are often interested in actual-difference making causes. It should be noted that to 
agree to focus on actual-difference making causes does not commit us to determining SAD in 																																																								
3 There are interesting similarities between Weber's notion of biological normality and 
Wimsatt's (2001) concept of generative entrenchment, to be explored elsewhere. 
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the way in which Griffiths et al. do, who measure causal specificity only over the realized 
states of a variable. By contrast, Waters (2007, 574) only requires that many of the different 
states of a variable be realized in a population, not all of them. Thus, his conception of a 
specific actual-difference making cause is one where a causal variable for which there is actual 
variation in a population and where this variation explains the actual variation in an effect 
variable may also have unrealized possible values that contribute to its specificity. This is 
different from Griffiths et al.’s SAD, and it is fully compatible with my approach taken here, 
so long as it is made clear that the unrealized possible values of the variable in question are in 
the set of relevant possibilities.  
 Waters’s account thus construed may also be able to deal with the gerrymandered cases 
discussed above. For those cases require variation in causal variables that are usually not 
actual difference-makers, e.g., codon-amino acid assignments or the recognition sequences for 
splicing. However, Waters’s account will also exclude cases such as the DSCAM gene 
examined by Griffiths et al. where DNA is not an actual-difference maker in the populations 
of interest. For this reason, I think that relevant potential variation is the best choice. 
 A final but important desideratum, as Griffiths et al. (2015, 545) remind us, is that the 
relevance criteria be “rigorously enforced” for both genetic and non-genetic causes when 
comparing their causal specificity, on pains of violating parity of reasoning. This is what I aim 
for in the following two sections. 
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4. Relevant Potential Variation Due to Alternative Splicing 
One example considered by Griffiths et al. is the Drosophila DSCAM gene.4 This gene has a 
complicated intron-exon structure and is subject to a remarkable and unusually massive 
amount of alternative splicing. This means that, depending on the cell’s differentiation state, 
different parts of the gene are removed by splicing. Thus, rather than coding for a single 
polypeptide, the gene rather provides coding cassettes that can be combined in many different 
ways. By mutually exclusive alternative splicing5, there are an impressive 38,016 splice 
variants each of which can lead to the production of a different protein molecule. While 
alternative splicing is quite common in eukaryotic genes, not all cases exhibit this massive 
range of splice variants. For the purposes of this discussion, we can describe the splice 
mechanism as a cause of protein sequence that has 38,016 different states that map bijectively 
to 38,016 different protein sequences. Using their specificity measure, Griffiths et al. calculate 
that the causal specificity of this mechanism amounts to 15.2 bits. At the same time, they 																																																								
4  DSCAM stands for Down Syndrome Cell Adhesion Molecule. It is a surface protein 
expressed predominantly in neurons and appears to mediate specific cell-cell interactions. In 
invertebrates it is implicated in immune defense while its role in mammals is less clear at 
present.  
5 In this mode of alternative splicing, one of two exons is retained while the other one is 
removed. Other modes include exon skipping, where a number of adjacent exons are either 
retained or not, or alternative 5'-donor or 3'-acceptor sites. 
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calculate the causal specificity of the DNA to 0 bits, because they assume that there is only 
one state in the population they are considering (a population of neurons in a Drosophila 
brain). Thus, Griffiths et al. here compare the causal specificity of actual variation of the 
different causes (SAD) here. If this is what is being compared, alternative splicing turns out to 
be causally more specific than DNA variation. 
 How about the other examples discussed in the paper? First, let us consider the 
DSCAM homologs in humans. Here, there are two homologous genes, each of which has only 
3 splice variants. Thus, the causal specificity of splicing comes out as 1.6 bits while that of 
DNA sequence variation as 1 bit. Again, the causal specificity measured concerns actual 
variation. Finally, in the case of the entire class of vertebrate cell adhesion molecules, some 
100 genes are capable of generating approximately 150 splice variants each. In this case, the 
causal specificity amounts to 7.2 bits for alternative splicing and 6.6 bits for DNA variation. 
Griffiths et al. conclude that, in this case, “[b]oth DNA and splicing variables are important 
determinants of diversity in this class of transcripts” (549).  
  What happens when we take into account not only the actual variation but also all the 
relevant potential variation or REL? Is it true that, as Griffiths et al. (2015, 546) claim, “the 
machinery of splicing also changes over evolutionary time, so in the evolutionary case the 
‘biologically normal’ variation in splicing is greater than the amount of variation observed in 
any actual population”? I must disagree. What we are considering here is the possible 
variation in protein sequence producible by different alternative splicing machineries while 
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holding constant the sequence being spliced. This includes only the variants producible by 
alternative splicing of this same sequence. Within these constraints, evolutionary change in the 
splice machinery cannot produce additional variants, so I shall argue. 
 To see this, we must take into account some details of the splicing mechanism (for the 
following, see Alberts et al. 2015, 310-320). The boundaries of exons (=coding sequences) 
and introns (=interspersed non-coding sequences) are marked by three kinds of repeated RNA 
sequences known as “splice signals” that are required for RNA-splicing to occur: The 5’-end 
of introns is marked by the sequence AG⏐GURAGU where R is a purine (A or G). The 
vertical bar indicates where the splice enzymes cut the RNA when the intron is removed. 
Somewhere within the intron sequence, we find the signal YURAC where Y is a pyrimidine 
(C or U). Finally, at the 3’-end the signal YYYYYYYYNCAG⏐G defines the end of the 
intron, again with “⏐” showing the exact splice site. Only if these three signals occur in a 
repeated fashion on an RNA molecule can alternative splicing work. Of course, there is no 
necessity in the precise nucleotide sequences of these signals; they could well be otherwise. 
Also, there is no telling how many different such sequences could do the same job if the 
specificities of the splice enzymes were altered. Clearly, by altering the enzyme specificities 
and the splice signals, a vast number of alternative splice variants could be produced from any 
given gene. 
 Nonetheless, the question is if this potential variation is what matters. When we 
consider a specific genetic locus such as DSCAM and want to know what the causal 
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specificity of the alternative splicing mechanism is at this locus, then we should let the RNA 
sequence of the primary transcript unaltered. Now, this sequence is very unlikely to have 
another set of repeated sequences that could serve as splice signals in addition to its actual 
splice sequences. If we altered the specificity of the splice enzymes, we would therefore not 
obtain a whole new set of alternative splice variants that could be made from the same gene 
sequence. Instead, there would not be any splicing going on at all. This is the reason why, 
unlike the DNA sequence and the mRNA sequence, the splice mechanism itself does not have 
any excess potential variation. What you see is what you get. 
 Having thus presented an argument that limits the variation and therefore causal 
specificity due to alternative splicing, I shall discuss two potential sources of extra variation. 
 First, don't we have to take into account evolutionary mechanisms such as exon 
repetition, shuffling, and inversion, as well as cryptic splice sites?6 I think we can safely 
disregard the first three of these. For as I have already argued, what we are interested in here is 
potential variation that is due to variation in splice enzymes while we hold the primary 
transcript constant. The first three evolutionary mechanisms just mentioned change the 
primary transcript, so they are irrelevant to my argument. The case of cryptic splice sites is 
somewhat more complex. Here, we must distinguish between two distinct phenomena: (1) 
inactive splice sites that become activated due to a cis-mutation in the splice site itself. Such 
mutations also change the primary transcript and are therefore not relevant to my argument. 
																																																								
6 I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to these mechanisms. 
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(2) Cases of so-called "splicing error" where the spliceosome erroneously recognizes a cryptic 
signal that resembles a normal splice site with some low frequency (see Alberts et al. 2015, 
321-322). This kind of variation may be relevant to my argument, however, it is unlikely to 
contribute much to splicing-related causal specificity both due to its low frequency and its 
aleatoric character.7  
Second, another potential source of additional potential variation that we have to 
consider comes from mad gerrymandered cases, such as the following. Imagine that, each time 
after an intron is removed, the recognition sequences of the splicing enzymes change by a 
hypothetical intervention. To make this scenario more precise, consider the real causal graph 
that connects a cell's set of spliceosomes with its population of mRNAs. If alternative splicing 
is going on, the former is a causal difference-maker with respect to the latter. In accordance 
with interventionist causal theory, we can represent the spliceosomes and the mRNAs by 
variables, say, C and E that take discrete values C1…Cn and E1…En. Now for the mad part of 
the scenario: Instead of over well-behaved spliceosomes or different states thereof, we let the 
C-variable range over hypothetical mad splice agents that change their recognition sequence 
each time after cutting an intron. For example, we could let each individual value Ci stand for 
a mad spliceosome variant that recognizes a sequence α in the first cut, sequence β in the 
second cut, γ in the third cut, and so on. Now let C range over all possible combinations of 																																																								
7 In general, noise in genetic mechanisms is an interesting issue form the point of view of 
information theory that might merit philosophical scrutiny. 
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α, β, γ, and over all other possible recognition sequences δ, ε, φ, …, and combinations thereof. 
Obviously, in this way a much larger number of different mRNA sequences can be produced 
from the primary transcript than with well-behaved spliceosomes that recognize always the 
same splice signals. Because it measures potential variation and maximal entropy and the mad 
spliceosomes are conceptually and physically possible, INF therefore returns a high causal 
specificity. However, this is exactly the kind of irrelevant variation that is ruled out by the 
biological normality criterion. The upshot of this discussion is that INF cannot distinguish 
between relevant and irrelevant causal specificity. 
To conclude, I have shown in this section that the relevant potential variation in 
alternative splicing is identical to the variation producible by mutually exclusive alternative 
splicing and related mechanisms of the respective gene. As a result, the relevant causal 
specificity REL is given by the values that Griffiths et al. calculated and we do not have to 
worry how many different splice mechanisms evolution might be able to produce. 
  
5. Relevant Potential DNA Sequence Variation 
Of course, we still need to show quantitatively that causal specificity of the REL-kind is 
actually greater for the coding sequences. It is easy to calculate the mutual information of 
possible interventions on DNA or mRNA coding sequences with respect to protein sequences. 
Let us consider a coding sequence of 999 bases length, which is about average (DSCAM is 
much longer, with 6kb). Applying combinatorics, there exist 4999 different sequences of that 
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length (because there are that many ways of combining the four bases A, T, G, and C to a 
string of 999 bases length). Because of the triplet code, this sequence can in principle code for 
a protein of 333 amino acids length. Because there are 20 amino acids to choose from at each 
position, there are 20333 possible protein molecules that could be made. This is much more 
than the number of atoms in the universe, which is estimated to be in the region of 1080. 
 Let us calculate the causal specificity of the causal connection DNA → protein. From 
the 4999 possible nucleotide sequences already calculated we can make 20333 different proteins 
of that length, which equals about 4720. This reduction by 4279 is due to the redundancy of the 
genetic code. The mRNA → protein mapping is therefore not a bijection; it is surjective but 
not injective. However, for a causal specificity calculation à la Griffiths et al. this doesn't 
matter, because we can assume for our purposes that the value of the mRNA sequence variable 
completely determines the protein sequence variable. In such a case, the mutual information 
about the effect variable that can be obtained by setting the cause variable to a certain value is 
given by the number of states of the effect variable, assuming that these are equiprobable. We 
thus get an information content of log220333 = 1441.6 bits. In other words, setting the state of 
the mRNA variable by an intervention reduces our uncertainty about the corresponding 
protein’s amino acid sequence by 1441.6 bits, which is by far superior to that of the alternative 
splicing mechanism. 
 Critics may object to these figures as not being relevant, because this potential 
variation is surely never realized. So how is it biologically meaningful?  
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To counter this objection, I wish to point out that we can limit the range of variants to 
biologically realistic scenarios and still obtain a causal specificity that is vastly superior to 
anything an alternative splice mechanism could produce. An example of such a scenario 
would be the following: Let us consider the variation that can be produced by taking a protein 
of 333 amino acids length and allowing two independent amino acid substitutions at two 
different sites. This kind of double mutation occurs frequently enough to be biologically 
relevant. Importantly, it does not require an evolutionary timescale (cf. Griffiths et al. 2015, 
551). Evolution does not even have to enter into the picture at all. Even on much shorter 
timescales, e.g., a few generations, the relevant protein sequence variation producible by DNA 
mutations is causally more specific than variation due to alternative splicing. 
All that matters for my argument is that we are able to answer questions such as this: 
Q: What would be a biologically relevant range of alternative states (or possible worlds, if you 
prefer) for this gene? A: All the allelic variants that could have been produced by a few 
biologically normal interventions at a non-negligible probability in the immediate ancestors of 
the cell/organism in question, e.g., point mutations. My point is that even this restricted range 
of alternatives very quickly takes us to very high values of causal specificity.  
For two point mutations, which could surely occur within a few generations in a 
biologically normal way, we already have a causal specificity of  
 
log+ 333 ∗ 3322 ∗ 20+ ≈ 24.4 
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which is already substantially higher than alternative splicing in Drosophila DSCAM. The 
figure rises rapidly if we allow not only single amino acid substitutions, but other naturally 
occurring mutations such as frameshift mutations, insertions, deletions, inversions, 
duplications, etc. This kind of variation is biologically relevant. The reason why it is relevant 
is not the fact that it is actually realized in any population (for it may not be for all DNA 
sequences) but that new variants can be produced by biologically normal interventions, as it 
was the case for alternative splicing. 
 I conclude that there is a relevant kind of causal specificity with respect to protein 
sequences that is greater for DNA and mRNA than for alternative splicing. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The mutual information of variables associated with interventions on a causal variable, 
proposed as a measure of causal specificity by Griffiths et al., distinguishes some causal 
factors from others and may very well be what incites biologists to often highlight DNA as a 
major cause even though myriads of other causal factors are involved in most biological 
phenomena. I have argued in this discussion note that what matters in many biological 
contexts is not the causal specificity of the actual variation of an actual-difference maker nor 
of the potential variation of the actual-difference making causes, but the specificity of the 
relevant potential variation in a causal variable. Then, I have shown that this relevant potential 
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variation exhibits a higher causal specificity in the case of DNA and mRNA than in the case of 
splicing agents in biologically realistic cases. 
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